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Abstract
In this article, we compare Ricard Zappata-Barrero’s interculturalism with Tariq Modood’s
multiculturalism. We will discuss the relation between distinct elements that compose
both positions. We examine how recent discussions on interculturalism have the
potential to contribute to theories of multiculturalism without undermining their
core principles. Our position is close to that of Modood’s as he has already carefully
tried to incorporate interculturalist insights into his own multiculturalism. Yet we
provide a raise a few questions regarding Modood’s treatment of the relation
between multiculturalism and interculturalism. After summarizing each author’s
potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between their basic
elements: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue;
(III) The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level;
(IV) The relation between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and
mainstreaming.
Keywords: Contact hypothesis, Intercultural dialogue, Integration,
Interculturalism, Multiculturalism, Ricard Zapata-Barrero, Tariq Modood
Introduction
Zapata-Barrero (2017) offers an accurate and nuanced depiction of the dominant political
narrative of the rise and fall of interculturalism and multiculturalism. The diagnostic he
poses has three moments: the fall of multiculturalism, the rise of civic integration and the
rise of interculturalism. After enjoying tremendous popularity in the 1990s, multicultural-
ism came under attack from both ends of the political spectrum in the 2000s. The discon-
tent with multiculturalism reached its peak in 2010 when its death was proclaimed by
European leaders (Cameron, Merkel and Sarkozy). The dominant discourse claims that
multiculturalism celebrates difference but not unity, that it grants rights to immigrants
without imposing duties to integrate to the host society, and that it leads to the fragmen-
tation of society by enabling them to live in parallel micro-societies. Two political reac-
tions came out of the proclaimed fall of multiculturalism. On the one hand, a nationalist
discourse of civic integration emerged, promoting a duty-based approach according to
which government should enforce the obligation to integrate and to embrace the values
of the host societies, mostly through citizenship tests (Goodman, 2010; Joppke, 2007;
Joppke, 2012; Joppke, 2017). On the other hand, interculturalism emerged as an allegedly
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more diversity-friendly discourse refusing both the multicultural fragmentation of society
and the nationalistic and coercive overtone of civic integration.
Although we agree with this picture of the state of the political discourse on multicultur-
alism today, we embrace Modood’s (2017) claim that this widespread view is not critical
enough of the dominant narratives on multiculturalism. The discourse on the death of
multiculturalism, and the accompanying celebration of either civic integration or intercul-
turalism, distorts and misrepresents multiculturalism both in theory and in practice. On the
one hand, interculturalism and multiculturalism, at least in their liberal-egalitarian variants,
share a common normative core at the level of political morality, as they both reject cultural
assimilationism and promote the respect of ethnocultural practices compatible with basic
liberal democratic principles (Maclure, 2010). In recent years, theoretical accounts multicul-
turalism have mostly adopted a civic variant of multiculturalism, one that emphasize
cross-cultural interactions and dialogue as a way of creating new forms of belonging in
diverse societies (Maclure, 2010, p. 41). On the other hand, multiculturalism is not against
promoting integration, it seeks to provide immigrants with fair terms of integration (Balint
& de Latour, 2013; Kymlicka, 1995). As such, it not incompatible with liberal measures of
civic integration, although it severely condemns illiberal projects of civic integration as
assimilationist projects in disguise (Kymlicka, 2012, pp. 15–16).
Nonetheless, in comparing both papers, it appears that important differences arise
between Zapata-Barrero’s (2017) interculturalism and Modood’s (2017) multiculturalism.
To comment on those two important contributions, we propose to do a bit of chemistry.
We will comment on the relation between the distinct elements that form the composite
substance of both positions in order to find our way to a mixture optimally adapted to the
current predicament of immigration societies. We believe such mixture has a similar taste
than Modood’s brew as he has already carefully tried to incorporate interculturalist insights
into his own multiculturalism, yet some fermentation is still needed. After summarizing
each author’s potion (I), we will comment on the following set of relations between basic
ingredients: (II) The relation between intercultural contact and intercultural dialogue; (III)
The relation between contact at the local level and the societal/state level; (IV) The relation
between group-specific measures, intercultural contact and mainstreaming.
I interculturalism and multiculturalism: distinction and incorporation
According to Zapata-Barrero (2017), the three distinctive features or basic elements of
interculturalism as a policy paradigm distinct from both civic integration and multicul-
turalism are (1) that it promotes contacts and interactions between individuals with dif-
ferent ethnocultural backgrounds, (2) that it focuses on the local level and (3) that it
relies on mainstreaming strategies. Interculturalism encourages “contact between
people from different backgrounds” (p. 7–8). Here, ‘contact’ refers to face-to-face inter-
actions between individuals of different ethnocultural groups (p. 14). Those interactions
are distinct events located in space and time involving real persons and therefore, as
we will explain later, the notion of intercultural contact is distinct from that of intercul-
tural dialogue. Moreover, Zapata-Barrero insists that contacts cannot be obtained by
coercive means (p. 9). It is because of this emphasis on contacts that interculturalism
operates at the local level, that is, the level where face-to-face interactions happen. In
contrast, both multiculturalism and civic integration, with their respective focus on
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rights and duties, operate exclusively at the state level (p. 13). According to him, inter-
culturalism ignores the dead-end task of specifying the rights and duties of immigrants
and turns to the more productive one of promoting contact zones and shared spaces
within cities. Finally, he adds that both civic integration and multiculturalism design
policies which target immigrant groups as their recipients, thereby creating a distinc-
tion between “us”, the natives, and them, the newcomers. The former singles out immi-
grants as the bearers of duties to integrate and as subjects to citizenship tests
(Goodman, 2010), the latter targets immigrants as the bearers of group-specific rights
(Kymlicka, 1995). Interculturalism aims to avoid reinforcing this us/them distinction by
relying exclusively on mainstreaming policies, that is, on measures that do not specific-
ally target immigrant groups but rather the whole population (p. 15–16).1
Modood (2017) disagrees with the claim that there is a sharp contrast between inter-
culturalism and multiculturalism. He notes that within the fields of political theory and
political philosophy, researchers have for long emphasized the role of intercultural dia-
logue as well as the qualified importance and recognition of the majority. To oppose
interculturalists such as Cantle (2016) and Zapata-Barrero who claims that their views
are radically new because they emphasize intercultural interactions, he carefully draws
on the scientific literature on multiculturalism to show, convincingly, that most canon-
ical texts in this field, Taylor’s (1994) The Politics of Recognition, Young’s (1990) Justice
and the Politics of Difference, Parekh’s (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism, Tully’s
(1995) Strange Multiplicity and his own Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Modood,
2007) embrace dialogue between different cultural traditions as a method to arrive at
fundamental political principles. To counter the claim that multiculturalists are insensi-
tive to the legitimate goals and aspirations of the ethnocultural majority—a claim
championed by Bouchard (2015)—he explains how the recognition of the majority in
his theory is compatible with group recognition. To show this, he claims that symbolic
recognition of minorities can be done in an even-handed fashion, without removing
existing privileges for the majority, and that instead of removing existing religious in-
struction for the majority religion, we should offer religious instruction for religious mi-
norities as well.2
The picture of multiculturalism drawn by Modood (2017) clearly differs from the
caricature promoted by the post-multiculturalism discourse, but it also differs sensibly
from Zapata-Barrero’s (2017) interculturalism, for whom the three pillars of intercultur-
alism are the promotion of contacts between individuals with different cultural attach-
ment, the rejection of a state-centric policy paradigm and the corresponding
promotion of the role of cities, and the promotion of mainstreaming as opposed to
group-targeted measures. Modood’s view in comparison is still, for the most part, state-
centric, as we explain in the next section (and this is not necessarily a problem as we
will explain in section III) and emphasize group-targeted measures and group recogni-
tion. Modood’s multiculturalism is thus much closer to Bouchard’s majoritarian intercul-
turalism than it is to Zapata-Barrero’s “interactionist” variant (Rocher & White, 2014).3
II contact and dialogue
The notion of intercultural contact or interaction is conceptually distinct from the
broader notion of intercultural dialogue, which normally refers to the societal process
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by which ideas, values and practices emerging from different traditions adjust to one
another and negotiate their expression within a shared public sphere. Intercultural dia-
logue refers to the meeting of ideas, values, symbols and arguments, whilst intercultural
contact refers to the meeting of real people in specific physical places. Of course, the
two notions are not logically mutually exclusive, but they do not imply one another. A
specific intercultural contact between two individuals from different backgrounds may
or not lead to an intercultural dialogue—it can for instance consist of a discussion
about the weather occurring at the park—and intercultural dialogue may or not be a
process involving widespread intercultural face-to-face contacts in daily life—it can for
instance consists of a series of written communications in newspapers or academic
journals. Most importantly, emphasizing the value of one or the other may command
different policies. The importance of intercultural dialogue is likely to require that gov-
ernment be more sensitive to the values and practices of minority groups expressed by
their elites in various formal settings (courts, official public consultations, legislative as-
semblies and so on), whereas the importance of intercultural contacts is likely to re-
quire policies of urban planning emphasizing the creation of urban spaces conductive
to positive intercultural encounters.
Modood’s (2017) contribution highlights that the multiculturalism literature in polit-
ical theory relies on intercultural dialogue as a method to build normative political
principles:
Multiculturalists have rejected abstract reasoning by a sole reasoner or identical identity–
less individuals in favour of dialogue. They assume that the context for politics is already
thoroughly imbued with dominant ways of thinking and doing—with cultural orientations
such as national history and language, with religious and/or secular perspectives, with insti-
tutional norms and so on—and that these contextual factors cannot be abstracted out so as
to identify a set of principles of justice independent of cultural interpretations. (p. 5).
This, however, in addition to failing to recognize that Rawls’s “original position”
thought experiment is a heuristic device designed to bolster philosophical imagination
and not an alternative to inclusive public deliberation between flesh and blood citizens
(Maclure & Weinstock, in press), is insufficient for challenging the distinctiveness of
interculturalism. As we have explained, dialogue and contact differ, a point that
Modood (2017) himself acknowledges (p. 6–7). However, his discussion of the place of
intergroup contact within the theory of multiculturalism is rather short (as compared
to the central place given to dialogue). We believe that there is more to be said on the
value of contact within a theory of multiculturalism.
Interculturality plays a similar role in dialogue-based political theories and in contact
theories: that of reducing racial and ethnocultural prejudice and bigotry. The promotion
of face-to-face interactions draws on an insight theorized by Gordon Allport in The
Nature of Prejudice. The simple idea is that by communicating and interacting with
people from different racial and cultural background under conditions of (rough) equality,
we are inclined to abandon our prejudices and stereotypes. The idea of a dialogical polit-
ical theory is akin to this. By incorporating cross-cultural dialogue, we ensure that political
principles do not only reflect the dominant culture, that principles remain open to discus-
sion and negotiation and we build trust between communities (Modood, 2017, p. 5).
When discussing the topic of intercultural dialogue, Modood (2017) mentions several of
the main contributors to the field of multicultural theory (Benhabib, 2002; Parekh, 2000;
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Taylor, 1994; Tully, 1995; Young, 1990). What is striking is that one of the main pioneers of
this field, Kymlicka, is missing from this picture. This is no surprise, as a normative political
philosopher, Kymlicka practices a different style of political theory. He seeks to specify the
institutional background conditions–the distribution of rights and duties–that needs to be
in place so that each is treated in a fair way. The topic of intercultural contact, as different
from intercultural dialogue, finds little examination in his work. He addressed intercultural
dialogue mostly through the claim that although multiculturalism needs intercultural citi-
zens capable of interacting constructively despite their different ethnocultural and religious
affiliations, there are unresolved tensions between intercultural civic virtues and the multi-
cultural state.4 He focused mostly on the educational implications of intercultural citizen-
ship rather than on the importance of promoting face-to-face contact within urban settings
(Kymlicka, 2003). However, his account of multiculturalism is not incompatible with the
promotion of intercultural interactions. Polyethnic groups in his theory are owed fair terms
of integration to the societal cultural of the host society, not autonomous self-government
with the capacity to maintain a distinct societal culture (Kymlicka, 1995). The logic of fair
integration is to lift obstacles to participation to common societal culture. This, one may
argue, will lead to more interactions, not parallel lives. Kymlicka does not link fair terms of
integration to Allport’s hypothesis, and does not elaborate on the implications of this for
urban planning, which is central in the interculturalism literature (see for instance Landry
& Wood, 2007). His more recent engagement with the inter/multi-culturalism debate reas-
serts that multiculturalism needs to educate citizens to be able to engage in positive interac-
tions with one another and takes for granted Modood and Meer’s view that there is little
difference between the theories of interculturalism and multiculturalism, albeit it is cur-
rently politically (rhetorically) useful to promote the interculturalism label given the un-
popularity of the term ‘multiculturalism’ (Kymlicka, 2016). Yet, although under-theorized in
Kymlicka’s work, the role of municipalities in promoting face-to-face contact by designing
urban physical spaces conducive to it is not incompatible with his understanding of fair
terms of integration. Moreover, as we suggest in the next section, certain propositions of
state-based multiculturalism (such as Modood or Kymlicka) are necessary conditions for
contact to lead to positive outcomes. This resonates with Kymlicka’s view that intercultural
citizenship and the multicultural state are complementary.5
III face to face contact and the state level
One reason why Zapata-Barrero (2017) rejects the multiculturalism policy paradigm is
that it is state-centred. Just as, in his view, civic integration focuses exclusively on the
duties that the state must enforce, multiculturalism focuses exclusively on the rights
that the state must protect. Both paradigms fail to see the role that municipal policies
can play in setting up physical spaces conducive to intercultural contacts, which are
likely to generate social cohesion, social capital and mutual understanding. We would
like to suggest that it is not clear that the promotion of contacts at the local level is
likely to lead to those desirable outcomes without support from the state.
Contact, to work, presupposes equality of status. This is recognized by Allport him-
self, who added several necessary or facilitating conditions to the simple formulation of
the contact hypothesis (1954, p., 281; as recognized by Zapata-Barrero on p. 8). He be-
lieves that were contact to happen between individual who do not enjoy equal status, it
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is not likely to undermine intergroup prejudice. In addition to the equality of status
condition, Allport adds that, to generate positive outcomes, contact must benefit from
institutional support, must be sustained and must happen between people who have
common goals.
It is true that local communities and municipalities can do a lot to promote
face-to-face contact: they can design enjoyable public spaces – parks, markets,
sidewalks, attractive neighbourhoods (Council of Europe, 2008, 2013; Landry &
Wood, 2007). However, most of the triggering conditions above-mentioned are
items that the state usually provides and secures. Equal-status of all citizens is best
promoted when the state avoids symbolically representing some citizens as infe-
riors, adopts anti-discrimination laws and redistributes wealth more equally. The
state is also a key actor in providing institutional support for long-term contact.
For instance, public schools are one of the most important places where meaning-
ful intercultural contact can happen. In employment, the public sector is another
important place where contact on a daily basis can be maintained. The national
level of politics can also be the locus of important common goals when citizens
gather around a collective societal project: rebuilding the economy after a crisis,
getting rid of corruption, facing an environmental crisis, etc.
Zapata-Barrero (2017) seems to worry that the only thing that the state can do is to
use its coercive power to enforce duties and protect rights. This would be an inherent
limitation of state-centred multiculturalism. In contrast, interculturalism, focused on
the promotion of contact, cannot be compulsory, given the well-known limits of polit-
ical perfectionism: “We cannot perceive interculturalism as something that should be
compulsory, as if it were a perfectionist philosophy. If people do not want to communi-
cate, we cannot force them” (pp. 8–9). Although, we endorse the rejection of political
perfectionism in relation to intercultural contact, the allegedly non-compulsory charac-
ter of interculturalism offers no basis to sharply distinguish this policy paradigm from
the multicultural one. To see this, we believe that Zapata-Barrero’s characterization of
interculturalism as non-compulsory needs to be unpacked. Four things need to be said.
Firstly, a liberal state should obviously not force people to adopt a conception of the
good life based on interacting with people from different ethnocultural backgrounds.
That a life shaped by cross-cultural friendships and deep understanding of various cul-
tures is superior to a life deeply immersed into one single culture is perhaps a worthy
personal ethical ideal, but it cannot be the justification of an enforceable public norm.
Secondly, it is not illegitimate to encourage cross-cultural interactions if there is rea-
sonable evidence that this will lead to greater toleration and respect between different
ethnocultural groups. Having citizens who can tolerate one another and respect one an-
other’s rights is a political value, not a comprehensive personal ethical ideal. Thirdly, al-
though one can identify public reasons to encourage contact, directly forcing people to
interact is not likely to be feasible for pragmatic reasons. Fourth, that being said, we
could still maintain that, on the basis of the instrumental value of interactions, public
authorities can nudge people into having more intercultural contacts by creating con-
tact zones and shared spaces of face-to-face interactions: “community gardens, libraries,
public amenities, festivals and neighbourhood spaces” (p. 14).
However, to conclude from this that interculturalism is not coercive (as opposed to
the multicultural or civic integration paradigms) presupposes an unduly narrow
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conception of state coercion. Indeed, many things that the state and municipalities can
do to promote contact is at least indirectly coercive. To promote contact within librar-
ies, park, public squares and public markets and cultural festivals, governments, na-
tional or municipal, need funding that they get from mandatory taxation. Moreover,
intercultural urban planning decisions are made to shape urban spaces in certain ways.
Desirable and justifiable as this may be, such decisions impose one spatial configuration
rather than another onto citizens who move through to the cities. Intercultural urban
planning is not individualist libertarian laisser-faire.
In sum, we can welcome the claim that multiculturalists should think more about the
key role of the municipal level of government. This, however, does not mean that a
sound policy paradigm dealing with the challenges of post-immigration diversity can do
away with the role of the state. This is especially not the case of a paradigm based on
the contact hypothesis, as the state has an important role in ensuring the conditions
for the success contact between citizens belonging to different cultural groups.
IV group recognition and intercultural contact
Modood (2017) welcomes the claim that multicultural political theory should incorpor-
ate a reflection on the value of face-to-face interaction and the means to better pro-
mote them. On the other hand, he also emphasizes the importance of recognizing
groups as such. He embraces the commonplace criticism of groupism and essentialism,
but thinks that group belonging is still politically salient and that groups can and
should be the recipients of certain policies and rights. How well can this recognition of
the salience of groups mesh with the promotion of intercultural contact? Would special
representation for cultural minorities undermine deliberation with outsiders? Won’t
separate ethnoreligious schools prevent pupils to interact with people who do not share
their ethnic and religious identity? Won’t cultural festivals only attract members of the
culture being celebrated and thus reinforce in-group boundaries? Those are legitimate
concerns and perhaps they provide support to Zapata-Barrero’s willingness to do with-
out group-specific treatment and to his reliance on mainstreaming policies.
However, one must keep in mind that group-specific treatment may be necessary to
correct patterns of discrimination and injustices that hinder the equal status of minority
groups, which is, again, one of the preconditions of the contact hypothesis. Immigrant mi-
norities are vulnerable to specific patterns of exclusion and discrimination that require
group specific measures (language acquisition, diploma recognition, anti-racism, ensuring
the visibility of minorities in the medias and public offices, accommodation in public insti-
tutions, etc.). This implies that mainstreaming cannot be a fundamental overarching
principle that rule out all specific treatment targeting immigrant groups.
Moreover, it is not clear that avoiding measures targeting specific minorities is always
better at fostering contact. Targeted measures aimed at accommodating minority cultural
practices within shared public institutions and at increasing minorities’ presence in the
medias and public offices are likely to make diversity more visible and thus to make con-
tact more meaningful and conductive to real engagement with differences. One may think
that public funding of minority cultural festivals and cultural organizations will lead to
ghettoization and the celebration of diversity at the expense of unity. However, it is
through such events and through the work of such organizations that minority cultures
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become visible to the rest of society and that opportunities for meaningful exchanges are
created (Boucher, 2016). Once tangible in this way, differences can be acknowledged, dis-
cussed and accepted. Interactions which actively engage with cultural differences may be
more likely to lead to positive outcomes than interactions which do not explicitly engage
with cultural differences.
Even the most difficult cases of group recognition may hinder contact less than is often
thought. For instance, special political representation, in the form of reserved seats in the
legislatures or ethnocultural quotas within political parties, does not amount to creating
separate ethnic parties and it could perhaps lead to putting diversity issues on the demo-
cratic agenda, thus leading to deliberation that engages with minority points of view ra-
ther than ignoring it. Separate ethnoreligious schools pose a greater threat to intercultural
contact. As we have highlighted, not all multiculturalists are in favour of them (Kymlicka,
2009). Still, we should note that such schools may contain hidden layers of diversity
within a distinct group (class, ethnic and racial diversity within a single religious schools)
and that in certain geographic areas which do not have a diversified population, common
schools are not necessarily more diverse than separate schools.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that as a civic and liberal political theory, multiculturalism
is not a policy paradigm promoting ethnocultural seclusion and the relinquishment of cul-
tural continuity (see Maclure, 2010, pp. 40–41).. Secondly, although the goal of promoting
contact is not incompatible with multiculturalism (and is often embraced by multicultur-
alists), it is conceptually distinct from the notion of intercultural dialogue central in sev-
eral multicultural theories. Moreover, even though the theorization of face-to-face
contacts in urban spaces is neglected in traditional multicultural theories, intercultural
contact is only effective when supported by national or state-based policies of multicultur-
alism. Finally, in order to promote positive intercultural contacts, we cannot abandon
group-targeted measures in order to rely exclusively on mainstreaming, although there
are some tensions between group recognition and the promotion of intercultural contact.
Endnotes
1See also Collett & Petrovic (2014).
2One could also add that in his liberal theory of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995,
2001) is quite comfortable with the view that the culture of the majority is given a pri-
vileged status as compared to that of immigrants. To start with, he claims that immi-
grants cannot hope to recreate their societal cultural in their host society and must
integrate it. Also, he maintains that host societies cannot abandon promoting and priv-
ileging certain cultural practices. The main example of this is language. Although soci-
eties can (and should) avoid having an official religion, they cannot avoid functioning
with one particular language and adopting the language of the historical majority is nat-
ural. He further claims that several measures of accommodation of immigrant groups
(group-specific polyethnic rights) are in fact a form of compensation for the impossibil-
ity of having a fully culturally neutral public sphere.
3We don’t have the space to expand here, but it should be noted that the object of Bou-
chard’s theory is what Quebec’s interculturalism policy ought to be (according to him), not
a description of Quebec’s past or current policy of immigrant integration and inclusion.
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See the references to interculturalism in Government of Quebec (1990) and Government
of Quebec (2015).
4To be more specific, Kymlicka believes that although intercultural citizenship supports
the multicultural state and vice-versa, there are unresolved tensions as 1) people are often
more interested in gaining cultural understanding of global cultures rather than learning a
the cultures of those who share the state with them (Belgian francophone more interested
in learning English than Flemish); 2) some ethnocultural groups (conservative religious
groups) have isolationist preferences accommodated by the multicultural state but irre-
concilable with intercultural citizenship and 3) sometimes the goal of intercultural under-
standing is unrealistic and what is needed for toleration in the multicultural state is
acceptance that others have deeply-held commitments, not a deep mutual cross-cultural
understanding on the content of those differences. (see Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 159–165).
5More specifically on the complementarity between intercultural cities and the multi-
cultural state, see Boucher (2016).
Authors’ contributions
Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Author details
1Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, KU Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000
Leuven, Belgium. 2Faculty of Philosophy, Université Laval, Pavillon Félix-Antoine-Savard, 2325, rue des Bibliothèques,
Université Laval, Québec, QC G1V 0A6, Canada.
Received: 4 December 2017 Accepted: 21 January 2018
References
Allport, G. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
Balint, P., & de Latour, S. G. (2013). Liberal multiculturalism and fair terms of integration. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Benhabib S. (2002). The Claims of culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bouchard, G. (2015). Interculturalism. A view from Quebec. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Boucher, F. (2016). Le multiculturalisme dans la ville : aménagement de l’espace urbain et intégration sociale
[Multiculturalism in the City: Urban Planning, Urban Space and Social Integration]. Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics
Forum, 11(1), 55–79.
Cantle, T. (2016). The case for interculturalism, plural identities and cohesion. In N. Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero
(Eds.), Multiculturalism and interculturalism: Debating the dividing lines, (pp. 133–157). Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Collett, E., & Petrovic, M. (2014). The future of immigrant integration in Europe. Mainstreaming approaches to inclusion.
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
Council of Europe (2008). White paper on intercultural dialogue. Living together as equals in dignity. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Council of Europe (2013). The intercultural city step by step - practical guide for applying the urban model of intercultural
integration. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Goodman, S. W. (2010). Integration requirements for Integration's sake? Identifying, Categorising and comparing civic
integration policies. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36(5), 753–772.
Government of Quebec (1990). Let's Build Quebec Together. Vision: A Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration.
Quebec City.
Government of Quebec (2015). Together we are Quebec. Quebec Policy on Immigration, Participation and Inclusion,
Quebec City.
Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe. West European
Politics, 30(1), 1–22.
Joppke, C. (2012). The Role of the State in Cultural Integration: Trends, Challenges, and Ways Ahead. Washington, DC:
Migration Policy Institute.
Joppke, C. (2017). Civic integration in Western Europe: Three debates. West European Politics, 40(6), 1153–1176.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural citizenship. A liberal theory of minority rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2001). Politics in the vernacular. Nationalism, multiculturalism and citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2003). Multicultural states and intercultural citizens. Theory, Research and Education, 1(2), 147–169.
Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies  (2018) 6:16 Page 9 of 10
Kymlicka, W. (2009). The governance of religious diversity: The old and the new. In P. Bramadat, & M. Koenig (Eds.),
International migration and the governance of religious diversity, (pp. 323–334). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2012). Multiculturalism: Success, failure, and the future. Washington: Migration Policy Institute.
Kymlicka, W. (2016). Defending Diversity in an Era of Populism: Multiculturalism and Interculturalism Compared. In N.
Meer, T. Modood, & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.). Multiculturalism and Interculturalism : Debating the Dividing Lines.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Landry, C., & Wood, P. (2007). The Interculural City : Planning for diversity advantage. London: Routledge.
Maclure, J. (2010). Multiculturalism and political morality. In D. Ivison (Ed.), The Ashgate research companion to
multiculturalism, (pp. 39–56). London: Routledge.
Maclure, J. & Weinstock, D. (in press). Two Conceptions of Public Philosophy. A Conditional Defense of Contemporary
Normative Theory. In D. Karmis & J. Maclure (Eds.). Civic Freedom in an Age of Diversity. James Tully’s Public
Philosophy.
Modood, T. (2007). Multiculturalism. A Civic Idea. London: Polity Press.
Modood, T. (2017). Must Interculturalists misrepresent multiculturalism? Comparative Migratrion Studies, 5.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-017-0058-y.
Parekh, B. (2000), Rethinking Muticulturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (2nd ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rocher, F., & White, B. (2014). L’interculturalisme québécois dans le contexte du multiculturalisme canadien [Quebec's
Interculturalism in the Context of Canadian Multiculturalism] (Research Paper no. 49). Montreal: IRPP.
Taylor, C. (1994). “The Politics of Recognition”. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism and the ‘Politics of Recognition’
(exp. edition), (pp. 25–73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tully, J. (1995). Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Young, I.M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Zapata-Barrero, R. (2017). Interculturalism in the post-multicultural debate: a defence. Comparative Migration Studies, 5.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-017-0057-z.
Boucher and Maclure Comparative Migration Studies  (2018) 6:16 Page 10 of 10
